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Introduction
In 1820, a fanatical Bonapartist named Louvel
assassinated an heir to the Bourbon throne, the Duke of
Berry. The crime shocked the whole of France. More
importantly, it symbolized the dividing line in the French
Restoration, between the years 1814-1820, and 1820 until the
overthrow of Charles X in 1830. Until 1820 it was hoped that
France could reconcile her new constitution, her
revolutionary legacy, and her ancient traditions and
insititutions.

After the Duke's death, France was burdened

with two hostile factions, unwilling to compromise and
moving toward opposite extremes.[!]
The reaction to Louvel's crime was most severe among
the royalists, those united by a fundamental belief in the
monarchy.

They perceived the assassination to be proof that

the political opposition would stop at nothing to achieve
its goals.

Prominent among the royalists in condemning the

act, and indicting its presumed liberal supporters, was the

1. Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, The Bourbon
Restoration[Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1966], pp.165-66.
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eminent literary figure, Fran9ois Rene Viscount
Chateaubriand (1768-1848). Though famous more for his
literary successes, including the .Genius of Christianity and
the novels Atala and Ren€, Chateaubriand in 1814 turned his
writing to politics, and until 1820 labored to defend the
Bourbon monarchy and the traditions of France which had been
threatened by the Revolution of 1789, as well as the Charter
which was born with the overthrow of Napoleonic government.
He is in many ways a curious figure in the
Restoration, a man dedicated to the monarchy, to religion,
to a glorified French history in which wisdom, toleration
and courage def.ined the Frenchman's life.

Yet he also

welcomed consititutional government in France in the form of
I

the Charter, and supported the idealism of the Revolution.
He represented in his views the old and the new France, and
for six years was confident that his theories could
reconcile the two.
It was an audacious goal he set for himself.

He was

not a systematic thinker, and trying to harmonize what were
of ten contradictory theories of government made his work
complex, sometimes simply confused.

Yet even if he did not

succeed in his task, his political writings became a record
of the many opposing ideas with which the Restoration
struggled.

The benefit of returning to his major works lies

first in understanding how one thinker of the period hoped
to restore political order to France, and, second,
understanding what were some of the major issues of the

J

day.
Many historians have sought to place Chateaubriand in
context with his time.

It is a difficult task, for his

ideas may be treated selectively, causing the reader to see
him at one moment as a reactionary, at another as a moderate
in support of constitutional government.

In a sense, none

of these interpretations are wrong: rather, they reveal the
true Chateaubriand, who was comfortable with his eclectic
vision.
One historian, B.D.Gooch, wrote that he was a romantic
and practical man, while "at the same time he was both
Ultraroyalist and liberal."[2]

Dominique Bagge called him

an Ultra-royalist under a parliamentary banner, and that his
major work, Le Monarchie selon la Charte, was beautiful but
without conviction.[3]

Louis XVIII's biographer, Philip

Mansel, argued that he was a moderate politican who became a
violent Ultra in 1815,[4] while Nora Hudson thought he
adopted an intermediate position which incurred the
criticism of the extremists.[5]

And finally, one important

2. B.D. Gooch,Europe in the Nineteenth Century[London:
Rainbow-Bridge Book Co., 1970], p.142.
3. Dominique Bagge, Les idles politigues en France sous la
Restauration[New York: Arno Press, 1979; reprint of the 1952
ed.], p.168.
4. Philip Mansel, Louis XVIII[London: Blond & Briggs, 1981],
p.344.
5. Nora E. Hudson,Ultra-Royalism and the French
Restoration[New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973;
reprint of the 1936 ed.], p.43.•

historian, Rager Soltau, failed ta mention Chateaubriand at
all, despite his popularity and leadership in the
Restaratian.[6]
Clearly, these varying interpretations suggest that
his ideas were too eclectic to be easily categorized.

They

also point to the difficulty ~f defining the different
schools of thought in the Restoration. A royalist was
fundamentally one who believed in the importance of a
hereditary monarchy, specifically the Bourbon line; religion
and tradition were also trademarks of a royalist's
position.

The other school, broadly speaking, was the

liberal, distinguished by its support of constitutional
government and the progressive ideas of representative
government promoted by the Revolution. Obviously, these
categories were somewhat artificial: within each there were
different interpretations, and often there were similarities
between the two.

Chateaubriand was an excellent example of

this connection between the two basic political views of the
Restoration.
It is not the purpose of this study, however, to reach
a definition of royalism or of liberalism, nor to outline
the political history of the period.

Rather, the intention

here is to examine Chateaubriand's political theory from
1814 to 1820, with the hope of better understanding how one

6. Roger Henry Soltau, French Political Thought in the 19th
Century[New York: Russell & Russell, 1959.)
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participant viewed his age and the problems it confronted.
While referring to some valuable secondary sources, the
study will rely primarily upon Chateaubriand's own
contributions, using his major political tracts and selected
journalistic efforts.

Chapter I

Chateaubriand's Political Associations

The political situation immediately after the initial
fall of Napoleon in 1814, was for Chateaubriand distinct
from the experiences of the majority of those strongly
identified with the Royalist cause.
groups.

These included major

One was the circle of emigre royalists, whose

general outlook remained largely anathema to the very idea
of the Revolution itself.

The second was the camp of

extremists closely connected to the Count of Artois, whose
idea of Restoration was consistently antagonistic to
anything but a full return of the old monarchical
principles.

And the third group was composed of Royalist

conspirators, known as the "Chevaliers de la foi'' (Knights
of the Faith) who displayed a rigid, secretive hierarchy
intent on the spreading of propaganda for the return of the
Bourbon line.[7]

All of these groups, loosely defined,

would had only partially attracted the attention of
Chateaubriand.
Chateaubriand's emigre experience, which took him to

6
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America, to London and various amorous adventures, and
finally to witness the sufferings of his family in the
Terror, was not closely tied to those of his fellow
emigres.

If one examines his actions during the youthful

period following his travels to America, there will be
discovered only a peripheral involvement in emigre affairs,
for instance in his joining the exile army at Coblenz in
1792, an exercise he himself characterized as folly.

His

Memoirs reveal, in fact, that this ragtag band seemed to him
"honorable and touching •••• It presented the spectacle of the
old monarchy and afforded a last glimpse of a dying
world"[8]

- hardly the stuff of inspired Royalist loyalty.

Little evidence can be found that the author of the
Genius of Christianity had m-0re than a passing interest in
the ambitions and passions of the more extreme wing of
Bourbon defenders, specifically the London emigres who
rallied around the Count of Artois' efforts to reinstate the
Bourbon monarchy.[9]

The murder of the Duke of Enghien, in

1804, led Chateaubriand to break with Napoleon, who
previously had made the author secretary to the embassy in
Rome. It was Chateaubriand's horror of Napoleon's treachery
which forced him to react decisively against the Emperor.
His lengthy account of Enghien's arrest and murder, retold

8. Chateaubriand,Memoirs, trans., A.T. de Mattos, 6
vols.[London: 1902], v.2, p.38.
9. Vincent W. Beach, Charles X of France: H1s Life and
Times[Boulder, Colorado: Pruett Publishing Company, 1971],
ch.3, passim.
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in his Memoirs, provided a portrait of a
for drama and suffering.

novelist'~

fondness

His emphasis was on the heroic

character of the Duke, and the tyrannical thirst for blood
in Napoleon's ambitions.[10]
This emphasis was of utmost concern, for it showed
already, long before the possible return of Louis XVIII,
that Chateaubriand was more concerned with the evils
generated by despotism than the fortunes to be wished for in
the memory of the Bourbons. While his contact with emigre
circles was at best limited, he had virtually no association
with the Count of Artois, nor with Artois' brother, Louis
XVIII. Neither figure appears directly in his general
correspondence,[11]

and of any contact with the Royal

circle, prior to 1814, he has this to say in his Memoirs:
I had been presented to the King's brother
[Artois]; he had been given my pamphlet to read,
otherwise.he would not have known my name: he
remembered to have seen me neither at the Court of
Louis XVI, nor at the Camp of Thionville, and he
had doubtless never heard speak of the Genie du
Christianisme.[12]
Chateaubriand may have been disappointed with this lack of
recognition, but his statement clearly establishes his
distance from the royal circle.

A third group with which

Chateaubri•nd may have had some contact was the ''Chevaliers

10. Memoirs, v.2, pp.256ff.

, ,

11. Correspondance generale, vols.l & 2 Paris:Gallimard,
1977.
•

12. Memoirs,v.3, pp.76-77.
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de la Foi," whose leader, Ferdinand de Bertier, insisted on
secrecy, obedience, fidelity to God, honor, king, and
country.

It was an association which may well have colored

his vision of the Restoration. De Bertier says that, "There
seem to be significant indications that Chateaubriand was
also a member of the order."(13] Yet Chateaubriand makes no
'
'

mention of it in his Memoirs, a deletion, perhaps,
occasioned by his unwillingness to appear compromised by
such an association; nor is there reference to the order in
his correspondence.

One can make no greater assumption than

that he was attracted, if at all, more by the romantic
notion of a heroic, knightly order than by the stern
commitment of its faith.

The lack of attention given by

Chateaubriand to the group, it seems, was one more example
of his distance from the organized royalist groups.
Notably, these assertions about Chateaubriand, that he
had little substantial connection with organized Royalist
activists, force us to recognize that at the center of his
conception of governmental authority and power was not a
naive belief in the sanctity of the monarchic system, but a
fear of the abuses of power, as manifested in the extremes
of Revolution, Terror, and above all, Napoleon's arbitrary
and capricious use of authority.
It was the Revolution and Terror, after all, which had
forced Chateaubriand and hundreds of royalist supporters

13. De Bertier,The Restoration, p.15

into exile, which led to his witnessing of suffering and
execution, and his feverrsh desire to combat excesses of
political fanaticism.

It was Napoleon who had recognized

Chateaubriand's talents and brought him into his
administration.

His new-found respectability surely must

have allowed a measure of gratefulness to the Emperor, and
yet with the

murde~

of the Duke of Enghien, this weak

affection was entirely destroyed.

Again, it was as witness

to excess, not as one concerned solely with the return of a
monarchic line, that he formed the basis of his political
creed.
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. Chapter II

The Intentions of Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons

In April, 1814, in the last days of Napoleon's rule,
Chateaubriand succeeded in publishing his famous pamphlet,
Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons.[14] It caused an immediate
sensation in France; Louis XVIII is said to have remarked so Chateaubriand reminds us - that the work was more
powerful than an army of one hundred thousand men, and
Napoieon himself was impressed, if indeed we are to believe
Chateaubriand.[15] The importance of the work for public
opinion lies in its

tim~liness,

its relentless quarrel with

all that Napoleon stood for, and the enthusiasm with which
he welcomed the Bourbons. It marked for the author, as well,
an emergence into the political limelight, comparable to his
reception in literary circles with his earlier successes.
Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons, issued in the midst of
political confusion and military defeat, certainly led
opinion to see the author placed squarely in the Royalist
camp.

It is still one of the most important documents of

14. Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons[Paris: 1814].
•

15. Memoirs, v.J, pp.65-66.
11
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the early Restoration, primarily because of its d~lineation
of the negative aspects of Napoleonic rule, as well for the
convenience with which Royalists then and later could point
to the legitimacy of Bourbon rule.

Its importance for us,

however, lies in a closer examination of its principles,
ievealing the inherent tensions of the return of the old
Monarchy.
Chateaubriand wasted no time in presenting his most
basic concerns: religion, nationalism, and especially
liberty.

The hand of Providence, he wrote, is present in

all that has happened, and Napoleon is without asylum.

With

Napoleon, the fatherland was brought to ruin; still, one
word lives, Liberty, which is not of itself responsible for
the crimes of the past: "La libert' ne doit point &tre
I

accusee des forfeits que l'on commit sous son nom."[16]

In

sudden, sweeping terms, Chateaubriand laid the foundations
for his later, theoretical distinctions from the traditional
views of the Ultras: one need not use the Revolutionary
Trinity, Egalit~, Fraternitt, Libert~, but Liberte cannot be
compromised.

Thus he started a theme which he of ten tried

to reconcile with his vision of the organic French nation.
It must be remarked, however, that this pamphlet was
emotional and perhaps even confused.

His argument revealed

the character of a man obsessed with deposing the great
emperor, the first necessary step in restoring any sort of
•

•
16. Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons,pp.l-2.

1J
stability and tradition to French society.

Furthermore,

there was a personal element to be admitted: he must have
seen his political future, and reputation, tied to the
success of his writing.

Beyond financial gain and the

possibility of a political position, he saw in his faithful
~rejects

the chance for being awarded the Cross of

Saint-Louis, and the military grade of colonel.(17]
No doubt, the opportunity to sing the virtues of an
old-regime France gave Chateaubriand ample room to imagine
an order of life distinguished by the spiritual nature of
the French people.

Napoleon's reign brought an end to the

customs and spirit of France: "In the name of (Napoleon's)
law, religion and morality were overthrown."(18]
Reminiscent of Burke's attack on the French Revolution,
Chateaubriand decried the renunciation of "the experience
and the customs of our fathers."

It w•s, in a sense, as

organic conception of traditional society as that evoked by
Burke; it countered the legalistic, artificial state to
historically'evolved society, yet it offered no evidence of
historical detail to substantiate its argument.
)

The newly

created, newly ordered state, consolidated by Napoleon,
became a society founded on uncertain reason, "sans pass~ et
sans avenir."[19]

It was not explained, however, just what

17. Chateaubriand, Correspondence generale, v.2, letter no.
649, 3 July 1814, pp.211-212.
18. Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons, p.2.
19. Ibid.

marked this so-called traditional society; religion and
morality were insufficient terms for historic definition.
Chateaubriand used this vague historic past simply as a
means to erase any claim of Napoleonic legitimacy.
The attack on Napoleon's rule also contained a curious
reference to having created a society "without past and
without future."

The past, indeed, was

~enied

by the

Emperor, but also by the Revolution. Napoleonic "despotism''
usurped religion and arbitrarily forfeited liberty, under
the false nationalism of a foreigner who deceived the French
people; the use of the spelling of Napoleon's name was quite
purp~seful,

noting the Corsican's foreign blood, a jab which

some translators have inexplicably overlooked.[20]

But what

of the "future" which Napoleon was accused of having
rejected?

Nothing of the future of the old regime was

explained, but worse still, Napoleon, who disavowed the
past, could provide only an interminable present, without
hope, with his vain, censorial regime.

Again, Chateaubriand

was unconcerned with establishing a solid historical vision,
intent only upon tracing the tragedy of France to Napoleon.
The immediate.power of Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons
was in its description of the betrayal of the French race.
"Chaque nation a ses vices.

Ceux des Francais ne sont pas

20. for instance, the translator of the Memoirs leaves the
spelling ~Bonaparte."
21. Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons, p.7.

la trahison, la noirceur, et l'ingratitude."(21]

Napoleon's

genius lay in his subtle rise to power; deception and
personal interest were his trademarks.

Chateaubriand feared

the ignorance of those born after the Revolution, that they
did not know france's ancient rulers, but saw only the
troubles and misfortunes of the past.

These youth, along

with the naive Republicans and Royalists who welcomed him,
were trounced by his true ambitions.(22]

The time would

come, Chateaubriand hoped, when the French would freely
declare that they had nothing to do with Napoleon's
inglorious heritage.
The use of police oppression to force the French into
submission was the hallmark of Napoleon's domestic politics;
I

a good administrator, yes, but of the necessities of life,
respect for rights, property, family, etc., his government
was the worst.[23]

In foreign policy, not victories but the

conscription will stand as the greatest symbol of his
rule.[24]

More notable for the modern student, having

witnessed the methods of the totalitarian state, was the
"Orwellian double-speak''of Napoleon's rule, the abuse of
language for state authority:
\

Alers commencerent les grandes Saturnales de
la royautJ: les crimes, !'oppression, l'esclavage
marcherent d'un pas egal avec la folie. Toute
liberte expire, tout sentiment honorable, toute

22.

Ibid~

pp.3-4.

23. Ibid., pp.8-11.
24. Ibid., pp.14ff.
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pens~e genereuse deviennent des conspirations

contre l'Etat. Si on parle de vertu, on est
suspect; louer une belle action, c'est une injure
faite au prince. Les mots changerit d'acceRtion:
un peuple qui combat pour ses souverains legitimes
est un peuple rebelle; un trattre est un sujet
fidele; la France entiere devient !'empire du
mensonge: journaux, pamphlets, discours, prose et
vers, tout deguise la verite.[25]
.
Without the prescience of a wider-ranging mind,
Chateaubriand still was able to understand the methods of
Napoleon, by which contrary opinions were reduced to
impotence.
In a summation of Napoleon's evil, in which
Chateaubriand addresses him in the personal, and
provocative,

~tu",

the Emperor was responsible for

destroying all of France's greatness.

The people wanted a

monarchy founded on the bases of equality of rights, of
morality, of civil liberty, of political and religious
toleration.

Instead he gave them impious war, the

imprisonment of the Pope, the murder of the Duke of Enghien.
He lost colonies, commerce, opened America to the English.
Who corrupted French customs, took children from their
parents, devastated families, ravaged the mind, inspired
horror in the name of France throughout the world?

It was

Napoleon. Behind the mask of Caesar and Alexander, he made
of France a ruined country.[26]
Such are the words, Chateaubriand wrote, with which we

25. Ibid., pp.7-8.
26.

1.2..!..£·'

pp.27-31.
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must address Buonaparte. But, he added, if we reject
Napoleon, who shall replace him?

It was, obviously, the

King, yet not so evident were the reasons for the choice.
Chateaubriand spent the majority of his pamphlet vilifying
the Emperor; here lay the burden of his propaganda.

The

French had to re-learn the truth of their rightful
inheritance, not be swayed by the foreign usurper.

It was

not just a despot they were to reject, however, nor was it
simply a Bourbon monarch they were to welcome: the King
represented in his title the idea of legitimate authority,
of order, peace, and legal and monarchic liberty.[27]

In

replacing one form of rule with another, Chateaubriand was
seeking not to merely elevate a royal person to power, but
to restore above all else the ideas of legitimacy.
In this we find an emphasis easily overlooked by those
who call Chateaubriand a typical Royalist. His language was
distinct: the King must represent the truths of his people,
but it is not as a leader with absolute power that he will
rule.

"Les fonctions attach,es ~ ce titre sont si connues

de francais, qu'ils n'ont pas besoin de se le faire
expliquer.~(28]

It was in the best interests of the people

that the King rule, but one may also assume, conversely,
that the King would lose his legitimacy if he did not
fulfill his functions.

27. Ibid., p.31.
28. Ibid.

This distinction, loosely applied in

19

the pamphlet, arose again when Chateaubriand differed with
the King and his ministry on the duties of his mission.
The enthusiasm of Chateaubriand calling back the
legitimate Monarch was subtly tempered by the role he was to
play.

France, misled by Napoleon, confused the proper role

of a ruler:
Le roi, le magistrat, le p~re; un Francais
confond ces idees. Il ne sait ce que c'est qu'un
empereur; il ne connott pas la nature, la forme,
la limite du pouvoir attache
ce titre etranger.
Mais il sait ce que c'est qu'un monarque
descendant de saint Louis et de Henri IV: c'est un
chef dont la puissance paternelle est reglee par
des institutions, temp~r~e par le temps, comme un
vin genereux, n~ de la terre de la patrie, et mdri
par le soleil de la France.[29]

a

Only a ruler blessed with the true blood of France,
not Napoleon's foreign blood, was capable of bringing to the
nation the virtues Chateaubriand extolled.
descended from the noble heritage of

And a Bourbon,

.Saint~Louis

and Henri

IV, inherited the experience of centuries, of. adversity and
glory, and would bring to France the greatness she once
enjoyed.

Were this misty idolatry not proof enough (and it

really was not, of course), Chateaubriand outlined Louis'
fitting qualities:
Non-seulement Louis XVIII a ces idees fixes,
cette moderation, ce bon sens si necessaires ~ un
monarque, mais c'est encore un prince ami des
lettres, instruit et eloquent comme plusieurs de
nos rois, d'un esprit vaste et eclaire, d'un
caractere ferme et philosophiques.[30]

29. Ibid., p.32.
30. Ibid., p.34

19

No doubt this passage, lifted out of context, could be
const~ued

.

as a complete endorsement of the Bourbon return

under Louis XVIII. But there was a clear, if subtle
limitation in the midst of this otherwise rosy picture:
. De taus les souverains qui peuvent gouverner

~ pr~sent la france, d'est peut-~tre celui qui

a

a

convient le mieux
notre position et
!'esprit
du siecle •••• Les institutions des peuples sent
l'ouvrage du temps et de !'experience: pour regner
il f aut surtout de la raison et de
l'uniformite.(31]
Chateaubriand envisioned louis XVIII as a wise, tolerant
king, willing to forgive the nation its crimes.

Above all,

he would guarantee the stability which was forfeited in the
upheavals of the past quarter century.
Chateaubriand, of course, continued to praise Louis
XVIII as this mast fitting King. Evidently there must have
been pressure upon the author (possibly financial, or his
own desire to be accepted), to make this pamphlet pleasing
to the most likely group to come into power, the Royalists.
Thus his warning was, albeit gentle, nevertheless clearly
pronounced.

A more conservative Royalist

would have

shuddered to see Chateaubriand betray the royal heritage.
Would it not be blasphemy to suggest that the king be
limited by institutions, especially those forged in the
recent past, the Revolution? That would mean that to accept
the King, one would as well be forced, at least implicitly,

31. Ibid.

- 20

to accept the Revolution! And yet it was quite clear that
Chateaubriand called for the King to be wed with the spirit
of the century.

Certainly not, he argued emphatically,

could the French accept the foreign dictator; but what then
was it to accept the times?

It meant clearly, although the

language was somewhat euphemistic, to concede to the basic.
reality of the Revolution.
Unlike Burke, whose attack on the Revolution was
explicit and fundamental - "To make a revolution is to
subvert the ancient state of our country; and no common
reasons are called for to justify so violent a
proceeding " [32]

- Chateaubriand seemed ambiguous about

the nature and justification of 1789. Whereas Burke abhorred
I

the reckless intervention of man into the natural order of
society, Chateaubriand was willing to see revolution,
particularly the French Revolution, as part of the
inevitable course of history.

As Paul Beik has written,

"One can see that he inclined toward the Greek view (of
history), however, and that for him the laws of nature made
for cyclical change rather than for evolution upwards."(33]
This allowed him a relatively dispassionate perspective on
the causes of the Revolution, one certain to receive little
goodwill from its orthodox critics.

It also offered him the

32. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France,
and Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man,[New York: Doubleday &
Co., 1961], p.181.
33. Paul H. Beik, The French Revolution Seen From the Right,
[New York: Howard Fertig, 1970], p.86.
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ability to see the French Revolution from both sides.

In a

footnote to his section 6n the "Encyclopedistes,'' in his
Essai historigue of 1797, he provided this assessment of the
philosophes' culpability:
Qu'il soit bien entendu qu'ils n'en sent pas
la seule cause, mais une grande cause. La
revolution fran9aise ne Vient point de,tel OU tel
homme, de tel ou tel livre: elle vient des
choses. Elle etait inevitable; c'est ce que mille
gens ne veulent pas se persuader. Elle provient
surtout du progres de la societe ~ la fois vers
les lumi~res et vers la corruption; c'est pourquoi
on remarque dens la revolution francaise tant
d'excellents principes et de consequences
funestes. Les premiers derivent d'une theorie
eclairee; les secondes, de la corruption des
moeurs.[34]
The Revolution could not be denied, therefore,
although one had to condemn its extreme results.
Chateaubriand had in mind the sufferings of his own family,
as well as the many ofthers caught up in the Terror. The
worst of these was Napoleon's conquest of power and his
degradation of the French spirit.

But in calling back the

Bourbons, Chateaubriand did not pretend to condone the
realities of the Ancien Regime. In Des Buonaparte et des
Bourbons, he sayed nothing of the corruption of French
customs or the Failures of the Monarchy. His Essai
historigue was written in a counter-revolutionary spirit,
yet he also felt a strong revulsion for the new society it
had created.

The most admirable aspect of the Revolution,

however, was its idealism; and though he did not reveal any

34. Essai historique, in Oeuvres Compl~tes, v.
1852], p.233n.
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great optimism for their possible fulfillment, he does see
in the ideas of the time a possible regeneration.[35]

It

was a sense of emptiness which the Revolution attempted to
overcome.

To go back to the Ancien Regime, then, would be

an exercise in futility.
At best, as Beik argues, Chateaubriand's so-called
traditionalism was one of despair.[36]

He saw in Napoleon's

rule a final loss of the nation's true spirit.

The

Restoration was not meant to be a return to the order of the
past, but a rebirth of the French spirit.

In this, the

Bourbons were the most representative of the highest claims
of all that was good through the centuries; but he also
understood that this was a spiritual

return~

not a reversion

to the corruption, narrow-mindedness, and emptiness that
brought on the Revolution.
Behind the laudatory language of Des Buonaparte et des
Bourbons, which was to the royalists its most estimable
aspect, one senses that Chateaubriand recognizeed that the
Restoration could be the only course open to France. The
only type of rule able to restore the natural French love
for religion, national pride, and liberty was that expressed
in the inherited wisdom and paternalism of the Bourbons.
There was a strong hope here that the Bourbon line was
capable of such a task, but there was, it seems, a caution.

35. Beik, Revolution Seen from the Right, pp.87-89.
36. Ibid., p.90.

It was Chateaubriand's insistence on Liberty (a term not
adequately defined in the pamphlet), a right of the French
which had to be respected by the king.

The circumstances of

publishing and having the work accepted by Royalist circles
certainly prevented Chateaubriand from outlining what he
intended

precisely, for it would have lost its most basic

appeal, a call for unified support for the Restoration. When
Chateaubriand proclaims, "Vive le Roi," it is only an
initial sanction; the complexity of the slogan is surely not
lost on the authox.
A final section of the pamphlet added still further to
understanding the complications of the Restoration. It was
the appeal to the Allies to support the Bourbon return.
Once again, he began by attacking Napoleon, defiling his
dishonest and cavalier conquest of Europe. But the tenor of
his writing shifted slightly from the praise with which he
welcomed the Bourbons and extolled the French race, to one
of political

exp~diency.

Obviously Chateaubriand could not

argue that to revive the claims of national pride would be
beneficial to the Allies. His encouragement for their
support of the Restoration rested largely on the
practicality which would serve their interests.
As de Bertier writes, of the Allies' demands,
Chateaubriand was not unique in demanding the overthrow of
Napoleon. The Allied Sovereigns, in their manifesto of
December l, 1813, declared that they "are not waging war
•
against France •••• They are only warring against the Emperor,

2:3
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or rather against that preponderance which he has too long
exercised beyond his empire to the detriment of France and
Europe."[37] But if there was consensus on deposing the
Emperor, it was lacking in the Allies' plans for choosing a
successor.
directly

t~

England's opinion on the subject conformed most
Chateaubriand's,[38] and he recognized the need

to persuade the rest of the European coalition through his
propaganda.
The Allies demanded that for the Bourbons to be
acceptable, the French people had to show their approval.
Chateaubriand's pamphlet (sub-titled specifically not only
for rallying the rrench, but also all of the European powers
around the Bourbon Restoration), appealed first to the
I

French for their natural goodness, then to the Allies for
their natural good sense.

Only with a Bourbon on the throne

would the French people be once more happy, and the Allies
expect the stability and'peace of ruling Europe alongside a
truly legitimate Monarch. It was the same argument as
throughout the work: Louis represented the glory and
sensibility of centuries of French leadership, and this
inheritance shared the same traditions and customs as the
rest of the legitimate Europe sovereigns.

The fear of a

foreigner whose usurpation of power brought· Europe almost to
ruin did not apply to "brothers united by the Christian

37. De Bertier, fhe Restoration, p.18.
38. Ibid., pp.19-20.

religion and their ancient memories."(39]

The Allies, after

all, were France's liberators, not her conquerors; they
recognized the true French from the Usurper.
Addressing the Allies, Chateaubriand's argument had a
tone of almost simple practicality, with an additional bit
of reverence for good measure.

It was the French people,

however, whom he saw as most in need of moderation, and
probably limited, by experience, in restoring unity to the
nation.

If Chateaubriand's traditionalism, as has been

said, was one of despair, his final words hinted at the same
sense, that simply restoring the monarchy would not by
itself heal France's wounds:
Francais! amis, compagnons d'infortune,
oublions nos querelles, nos haines, nos erreurs,
pour sauver la patrie; embrassons-nous sur les
ruines de notre.cher pays •••• Songeons que taus les
maux que nous ~prouvons ••• sont l'ouvrage d'un seul
homme. Faisons done entendre de .toutes parts le
cri qui peut nous sauver, le cri que nos peres
f aisoient retentir dens le malheur comme dans la
victoire, et qui sera pour nous le signal de la
paix et du bonheur: Vive le Roi![40]
Nowhere, perhaps, can one turn to find a more
devastating account of Napoleonic "despotism," yet behind
its impassioned rhetoric the pamphlet was hardly a
masterpiece of political theory.

Its author seemed only to

have grasped the broad outlines of legitimacy, and injected
into them the feverish impulses of the moment.

In 1814, at

least, such writing was enough to create certain celebrity.

39. Des Buonar:a!"te et jes Bourbons, .Po43.

40. Ibid., p.46.
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Chapter III

The limitations of Political Authority
Judging by this analysis of Des Buonaparte et des
Bourbons, Chateaubriand's Royalism was based on Monarchic
legitimacy, but with restrictions built into the King's
role.

Nothing concrete was mentioned of his support for

constitutional government, although the concept of Liberty,
vaguely outlined, stood out clearly.

Liberty and Monarchy,

two ideas with possibly contradictory implications,
therefore, formed the basis of his vision of the proper
order.
Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons was an emotionally
charged political tract; it lacked a tempered analysis,
which evidently did not take away from its overall
popularity.
shortcomings.

Its eloquence made up for its analytical
In fact, as C.T. Muret has written,

"Chateaubriand was neither a philosopher nor a statesman; he
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was a poet who had wandered into politics.

The source of
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·

his ideas was emotional rather intellectual, and he was both
royalist and liberal from sentiment more than from
philosophic conviction."[!]

His political theory might have

remained vague and untonvincing were it not for De la
Monarchie selon la Charte.[2] Many of his political writings
revolved around immediate circumstances;[3]

in this work,

however, he presented his comprehensive theory of
government.

It was, to be sure, substantially still a

Royalist tract, but Chateaubriand prefaced it by explaining
that the word ''royalist" was intended to embrace all the
royalists.

He recognized, just as,he did in Des Buonaparte

et des Bourbons, the divisions among those who favored the
return of the monarchy.

Though the work is not one of

penetrating insight - one commentator has written that
Chateaubriand lacked originality but not relevance [4] - it
is generally considered one of the most influential writings
of the period, and succeeded in placing the author in the
forefront of Royalism, even among those who worried that the
arguments were too liberal.
From the very beginning, Chateaubriand tried to appeal

1. C.T. Muret, French Royalist· Doctrines since the
Revolution[New ~ark: Columbia University Press, 1933], p.35.
2. N.B., separate edition of the Oeuvres
completes,[Bruxelles,1835], v.26.
3. See, for example, hi~ Opinions et Discours and Pol{migue.
4. E. Beau de Lomenie, La carri~re politigue de
Chateaubriand, de 1814
1830[Paris: Plan, 1929], II: p.354.

a

28 .
to French practicality; common sense, he wrote, is a thing
more rare than its good name suggests.

The Revolution, and

all the chaos that surrounded it, forced the French to
forget their proper sensibility.

Nonetheless, the nation

inherited a new system, established by the Charter, which
based

~epresentative

government on four parts: the Royalty

(or Royal prerogative), the Chamber of Peers, the Chamber of
Deputies, and the Ministry (later we shall see that he· might
have included the press as well, for its role was crucial in
a representative system).

The fundamental principle of the

constitutional, Royal prerogative was that nothing proceeds
directly from the King in the actual acts of government, but
that everything is the work of the Ministry. The King is
sacred

~nd

inviolable, in fact infallible,·and if there is

error it is the fault of the Ministry.[5]
The implication of this approach was

crucial~

We have

seen that in Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons Chateaubriand
conceived of the king's role as a symbolic one; he
represents the true spirit of the French, its past and its
ancient truths, but this does not give the king any type of
absolute power.

Because mistakes will be made in governing,

the king, by his very nature sacred and inviolable, must be
protected.

The Royalty must be preserved at all cost.

Thus

Chateaubriand carried his abstract notion of the King, and
the even more abstract notion of the French spirit, into the

5. De la Monarchie selon la Charte, pp.l-6.
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very workings of government.
A Royalist would have said that the King is above

responsibility; but because he relied on this abstract, hazy
vision of the King and his people to support his fundamental
beliefs, Chateaubriand worked himself into an obvious - and,
far a political theorist, embarrassing - contradiction.

For

if the King is infallible, why should he not make the
rules?

The Count of Artois might have found this a pleasant

possibility, but Chateaubriand, suspicious of any singular
consolidation of power, stopped short of any claim to
absolute sovereignty.
The real model for this monarchic rule was closer to
the English system than to that proposed by his more
conservative counterparts: the monarch, in essence, reigns
but does not govern.

It was a Royalism_inspired by the

pleasant vision of the King as a wise, paternal sovereign,
uniting in his title all the needs and gifts of the nation,
at the very least reminding the French that they are a
.united nation based on worthy traditions.

Yet it was also

restrained by pessimism, a distrust of excess power and the
abuse of accountability.

To lose a Monarch by his own

excesses, which absolute sovereignty invites, would be to
shatter the fragile stability of the nation.

Even in

England, Chateaubriand wrote, all harmony is lost if even
the King's name is invoked in debates in Parliament.[6]

6. Ibid., p.11.
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It is important here to mention an objection to
Chateaubriand's perceived role as a leader of the
Ultra-Royalist group, and the larger purpose of writing his
pamphlet.

General misconceptions have plagued secondary

interpretations by not drawing attention to the complexity
of his suggestions.

For instance, the excellent work by

Rene Remond argues clearly that Chateaubriand was a leader
of the Ultras, without mentioning that it was the Ultras who
adopted, quite selectively, some of his slogans.[7]

Or turn

to the helpful study by C.T. Muret, which states that the
Ultras "adopted the liberal theory of the responsibility of
ministers to the parliamentary majority, in order to force
their will upon the king.

Chateaubriand was in full

agreement with these views."[8]

Indeed, Chateaubriand

demanded ministerial responsibility, but only as long as it
was intended, ultimately, to uphold the Charter.
Certainly, the Ultras echoed many of Chateaubriand' s
views.

But the purpose in publishing De la Monarchie selon

la Charte was not to callously abuse the Charter for
elitist, reactionar; ends.

He believed deeply in its

necessity as a tool for modern government.

As we have seen,

Chateaubriand was suspicious of political power, whether it
be the fanaticism of groups, as in the Revolution, or the

7. Ren~ R~mond, The Right Wing in France, from 1815 to de
Gaulle[Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1966], ~.37.
8. Muret,french Royalist Doctrines, p.39.
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single-handed manipulations of Napoleon's rule•

Although he

wished to make some changes in the Charter's lesser rules,
he was convinced that it was to be the fundamental safeguard
of the liberties of the french.
The social situation which Chateaubriand alluded to,
the almost pastoral nature of f rench society in a
properly-ordered state, was far .from an egalitarian,
democratic state.

His idea of Liberty was defensive,

protective or basic claims to human dignity ••

He did not

promote ''progressive" ideas which sought in the idea of
Liberty fundamental changes in the social order.

He was not

closed to change, however; rather, he opposed excessive
power in any direction.

In this way, the liberals could, by

excising some of the more objectionable language, find much
to agree with in the pamphlet.
Just as the royalists claimed aspects of
Chateaubriand's thought, so, too, could members of the
opposition to the ''Chambre Introuvable" adapt certain
ideas.

Such adaptability, as well as the power and often

basic common sense of his writing, created a crossing of
lines, and blurred the distinctions which might have made
Chateaubriand a more easily categorized figure.

It also,

unfortunately, lowered his stock as a consistent and
predictable party leader.

De Bertier is correct in

asserting that Chateaubriand wished for a royalist majority
in Parliament, but its ultimate purpose was to be different
than what the core of the Royalists wanted.

Even de Bertier

admits, after all, that "the party considered Viscount
Bonald (a reactionary who found nothing legitimate·in
France's Revolutionary heritage) to be their real spokesman,
and he considered the Charter to be a work of ~ally and
darkness~"[9]

One may look upon Chateaubriand's goals as somewhat
politically naive, considering that he stuck to his moderate
royalist principles while many of the royalists themselves
differed in many real ways.

It was perhaps more reflective

of his pessimism, however, that he saw the true interests of
France protected in the history and traditions of the most
responsible class, which the Royalists comprised, even if
they would have to grudgingly accept the inevitable spirit
of the new century.

He was no more willing to compromise

his support of the Charter than he was to accept a France
governed by atheists, democrats, or regicides.
A good example of both the immediacy and subtlety of
De la Monarchie selon la Charte was his support of the open
initiative in Parliament. A conservative royalist might have
supposed that it was an attack against the powers of the
Ministry, which in part it was.
all it stood for?

But can we assume that was

Chateaubriand felt that the Ministry

should be held accountable for the errors of decision in the
executive branch, for obvious reasons.

The king must be

protected from the scandals which the Ministry had created

9. De Bertier,The Restoration, p.143.
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in its policies.

Primarily, these revolved around the sale

of national forests, which the royalists intended to return
to the Church; the dissolution of the "Chambre Introuvable,"
which was a legally constituted majority in Parliament, and
thus the Ministry's action was illegal, and immoral; and by
the general attempts to usurp power, especially the actions
of Decazes, the minister of police, in his intrigues in
Louis' court.

In these matters, Chateaubriand was in full

accord with the Royalist majority.[10]
His inspiration in publishing the pamphlet was more
complex, however, than a simple royalist reaction to the
offensive actions of thjs particular Ministry. He believed
strongly that.the conspiracies of Decazes threatened not
just the wishes of the majoriiy, but the nature of
representative government as well:
La proposition secr~te de la loi ne peut
mame jamais ~tre si secrete qu'elle ne parvienne
au public, defiguree: !'initiative franche est de
la nature du gouvernement representatif .[11]
furthermore, to renounce the majority, he wrote, was to
shatter the great jutisdiction of representative
government.

Certainly, ,it can be argued that Chateaubriand

was defending the interests of the majority; his language
emphasized, however, the need to transcend particular
issues, to maintain a vision of proper government:

10. Ibid., pp.!Jo-39.
11. De la Monarchie selon la Charte, p.15.
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I had resisted the seizure of the Monarchie
selon la Charte to enlighten misled royalty, and
to uphold the liberty of thought and of the press;
I had frankly embraced our institutions, and I
remained loyal to them.[12]
The institutions to which Chateaubriand refered were
noticably restricted to the balance of forces between the
Chambers, the King, and

th~

Ministry, as well as the press,

which was also a contributing force to harmony.

The changes

the Charter allowed, and which the Ministry was taking in
its own direction, prompted Chateaubriand to express his
fears about the impending destruction of representative
government.

He favored a vigorous role for the Chamber of

Peers, in part because it most conformed to France's true
nature, but also because of the dangers an irresponsible
Ministry and a powerful Chamber of Deputies would
create.[13]

The implicit suspicion of the Chamber of

Deputies, though not openly defined, rested on the
association of its aims with those of self-aggrandizing
politicians, for whom the future of France was of little
conce~n.

And the Ministers were no different.

The French genius was outside of the Chamber of
Deputies and the Ministry. It was symbolized in the
Monarchy, sustained by the Peers of France, and most
threatened by the selfish men who claimed to speak for the
people, and who turned Louis' ear the wrong way.

12. Memoirs, v.4, p.11.
•

13. De la Monarchie selon la Charte, pp.26-27.

The

Charter was to protect this delicate balance: we must make
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use of this Charter, Chateaubriand wrote, if we don't then
French genius is incompatible with representative
government.[14]

Again, the fear was expressed that abuse of

power was to be expected in the conspiratorial aims of the
Ministry:
La force d'un ministre francois n'est pas
seulement dens son cabinet: elle est aussi dens
son salon.[15]
Under no circumstances was a minister to be trusted,
especially when it came to influencing public opinion.
His most consistently expressed fear was that public
opinion could be distorted if there was no true freedom of
the press.

It was Chateaubriand's opinion that the journals

represented the reality of public opinion, the right of
dissent from governmental action.

In fact, the press was so

important that it could be considered a tribunal, just as a
Deputy was a tribune; this confirmed the interpretation that
he saw the press as a fifth organ of government.

It was a

logical argument, but it raised a curious and difficult
suggestion: Chateaubriand argued that just as a Deputy must
meet a certain financial requirement to sit in the Chamber,
so too must a journal meet requirements.

He called for a

thousand-franc deposit for all journals, which would assure
that the press was responsible to public opinion.

14. Ibid., p.30.
15. Ibid., p.54.
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an obvious dilemma which Chateaubriand passed over, namely,
that a required deposit provided opportunity for
censorship.

Deciding what was in the best interest of

public opinion was an arbitrary a form of control.

In fact,

"public opinion" was another unclarif ied idea useful to
Chateaubriand as a means of arguing that whoever the
opponent may be, was out of step with the truth.
It can be argued that Chateaubriand was caught up in
the same feverish pitch of politics as the rest of the
combatants in the battle for the Restoration. In many cases,
irrationality, or a gap in logic, interrupted otherwise
reasoned attempts to come to terms with the diverse forces
of the period.

The issue of a press law confounded most

theorists trying to reconcile a free press with the demands
of public morality and safety.

He was not alone, therefore,

in wrestling with the complicated issue.

On a broader

level, shortsightedness and reaction to immediate
circumstances forced a more notorious reversal of logic,
when in the debate on the Amnesty Law, the Liberals defended
the Royal prerogative "and the Ultra-royalists became the
champions of parliamentary authority."[16]

Such a

contradiction can only be understood in .light of the dangers
which all sides saw in any movements of their political
enemies.
In a political situation in which all factions see the

16. Ibid., p.135.
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moment as a critical turning point for the future,

inconsistency is bound to play a role, and extremism, often
deplored by all sides in more harmonious times, is justified
as a necessary resort.

There is nothing inevitable in

politics, and this applies to the Restoration: the force of
circumstance in a volatile time often carries the

d~y.

Neither the left nor the right exclusively planted the seeds
for the fall of the Bourbon line.

Unfortunately, the most.

salutary aspects of De la Monarchie selon la Charte could
not heal the divisions in France, and Chateaubriand's
impassioned pleas suffered the same fate as moderation of ten
does in times of crisis.

With so much at stake, and so many

opinions, one voice, determined to be fair, is easily
overwhelmed.

Chapter IV

le Conservateur, and the End of Moderation
Chateaubriand 1 s moderation and independence of spirit
never led him to abandon the Royalists in the political
fight.

He still showed a deep commitment to the idea of

Monarchy, of tradition, of religion, and especially of the
Charter. By 1818, however, after three years of political
turmoil, his fears of the encroachment of Liberal ideology
had become more pronounced.

Most telling was his alarm at

the success of liberal journals, such as the Quotidienne and
the Constitutionnel, both which displayed vague Bonapartist
tendencies.

The influence of Bonapartist and Liberal ideas

appeared to outweigh that of the Royalist press, and
Chateaubriand responded by acting as an editor and
contributor to the Conservateur.[17] In his Memoirs he
claimed the journal was of utmost importance to the royalist
cause.[18]

His leadership , because of his brilliance and

popularity, lent a great deal to its success.

It was

basically an Ultra organ, but his involvement kept it

17. Le Conservateur[Paris:l818-1820], 6 vols., issued
irregularly.
18. Memoirs, v.4, pp.16-17.
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strictly constitutional, and it succeeded in its primary
mission, which is apparent in reviewing Chateaubriand's
articles, in embarrassing the Ministry.[19]
A difference in tone emerged in his writing in the
Conservateur: just as Des Buonaparte et des Bourbons was a
vitriolic attack on the Emperor and a panegyric for the
Monarchy, and De la Monarchie selon la Charte was a more
analytical argument for constitutional, Royalist government,
Chateaubriand focused specifically on the Ministry in
moralizing, frantic condemnations.

Frustration, fear, and

finally a disgust with Louis' ministers informed most of his
articles.

The attacks were supported by urgent references

to the purpose of the Charter. Throughout, his writings
appeared to foreshadow his later, official break with the
regime, but at least in the journal his warnings were
articulated, devoid of his personal quarrels with the
Ministry; and his faith in the Monarch still existed, though
what Louis allowed strained the author's patience.
The

fi~st

issue (5 October 1818) began with

Chateaubriand's introduction and praise for the project
being undertaken.

Royalists of more conservative bent, whom

he considered to be his good friends, would also participate
in the journal's campaign, but immediately Chateaubriand
informed his readers that constitutional government was the

19. Irene Collins, The Government and the News a er Press in
France, 1814-188l[London: Oxford University Press, 1959 ,
pp.20-21.
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overriding concern of Le Conservateur. We want nothing that
is not constitutional, he wrote, "Nous voulons la Charte."
And he sounded the call which was the journal's slogan for
its entire existence: "Le Conservateur soutiendra la
religion, .le Roi, la liberte, la Charte et les honn~tes
gens, ou ni moi ni mes amis ne pouvons nous y
intJresser.''[20]

"HonnAtes gens" was not a term which

refered to simple, acceptable virtue; it compriseed a vision
of the social and political order which transcended the base
ambitions of the Ministry and the enemies of true
representative government, by invoking the 17th Century
notion 9f the term.

Whereas in 1815 he had hoped to appeal

to the good sense of anyone involved in government (recall,
too, the note of pessimism which surfaced in his writing),
it was now apparent that no hope remained for such a
tactic.

Only an attack on his enemies, comparable to his

attack on Napoleon,

would suffice.

Chateaubriand now

A
appealed only to his allies, the "honnetes
gens."

Whatever

sensibility existed could not be found in the Ministry.
Already his moderation was waning: the sense that all
factions might agree to unify for the sake of France had
disappeared, and it was. the fault of self-interested
politicians.

His opinion was that only the royalists, in

their support of king, religion, liberty, and the Charter,
wished to maintain representative government.

20. Le Conservateur, v.l, p.7.
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Chateaubriand saw also another threat, perhaps sooner
than many others recognized it, the abuse of the thoery of
Egalit~. Equality was fine,

of course, if it could only

work, but it was being invoked as a dangerous political
weapon, rather than as a sincere concern for all men.

for

all the supposed idealism of its advocates, they were no
different than the men of '93, whose hypocritical love of
liberty and equality came only from hatred and envy.[21]
Hatred was the motivation of the Ministry and the enemies of
Royalism; they were not to be associated with their claims
to a better system.[22]
Three weeks later, and in succeding articles,
Chateaubriand

b~gan

to express his fears more concretely.

Not only did the Ministry hate the Royalists, it was
attempting to gain greater power by enlarging the franchise,
bringing France to the edge of Democracy. A century and a
half later, such a fear would seem to many to reveal only
the worst of reactionary instincts.

But to Chateaubriand,

such an accusation carried the most serious of dangers, the
fear of the mob dictating its harmful ambitions.
)

If there was any constructive argument which came out
of Chateaubriand's articles in the Conservateur, it appeared

21. Ibid., pp.40-41.
22. Ibid., p.15.
23. "De la Morale des _interets et de celle des devoirs, 11
v.l, no.10, Dec., 1818, pp.466-78.
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in December 1 1818.[21] Chateaubriand referred to it in his
Memoirs as his most important contribution.

The Ministry,

he wrote, created a new morality, the morality of
interests.

Whereas the previous quarter-century staked its

power on the loss of moral conscience and the spell of
glory, the present Ministry based its claims on seduction.
Nothing more dangerous could afflict France. "Duty" is what
France was based on for fourteen centuries; the
Eighteenth-century destroyed that, and now all motivation
was based on "interest," which changed its nature whenever
it was to its· immediate benefit.

The morality of interests

was anti-social, and that was what the children were now
being taught.

Only bad would come from their education in

this life.
There was a glory which Chateaubriand emphasized in
the idea of Duty. lhe man who fulfilled his Duty in times of
the greatest challenge would gain esteem; the nation which
did so would gain its greatest glory.

People did not fight

for abstract ideas and gain anything, unless it wasout of
sacrifice.

The truth of

~ociety

was not to be found outside

of that sacred limit of Duty. And finally he offered his
prophetic warning For those who would
policies of the present: "With this

se~k

to continue the

~rofound

policy, when

the hour of devotion shall have come, each one will shut his
door, go to the window, and watch the Monarchy pass."[24]

24. Ibid. ,p.478.

The argurnent he offered was his last really calm
approach to the problems of the Restoration before the
assassination of the Duke of Berry. Censorship of the press
returned as the prirnary concern in most of his articles, and
the attack on the Ministry remained the motif.

There were

some gems of journalistic propaganda in the articles; for
instance, of the quality of the men now in government, he
said, "These pygmies have stiffened their hold in order to
support the colossal ruins under which they have been
lodged."[25]

But for the most part, Chateaubriand had

entered into the Royalist camp and there seemed no return.
The ministers, and his Liberal adversaries, probably would
not have compromised with him anyway, having failed to read
the moderation which he so wanted to guide the Restoration.
But with his angry language, any cooperation was moribund.
The Conservateur was in many ways the last effort the
Royalists were able to sustain in the hopes of possibly
transforming public opinion and Louis XVIII to their ways of
thinking.

They brought together conflicting personalities

and opinions, and for much of the two years of publication
the optimism that they would succeed in their efforts
somehow managed to continue, even if it meant periodically
offering the Ministry anolive branch.[26]

And beyond

politics, the journal offered colorful pieces on religion,

25. "Politique,, 11 \/.J, no.27, pp.3-13, April, 1819.
26. For example, "De la Liberti' de la Presse," v.5, no.54,
Oct., 1819, p.71.
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literature, the arts, and history, which might have
sustained an interest beyond the pessimism which was
gradually encroaching on the political scene.

One cannot read Chateaubriand's articles, however,
without feeling the frustration which emerged increasingly
in his attacks on the Ministry and the direction France was
taking.

His admonitions took on the aura of inevitable

failure, even while France had the greatest opportunity to
achieve the harmony, domestic and foreign, which he had
sought since 1814:
France, more than any other nation, is
closer to strength, peace, and order than any
nation in Europe. But within France, the
.
Ministerial system threatens this good state; the
Ministry is trying to do away with."les honnAtes
gens," and if it does, it will destroy the peace
of Eu r op e . [2 7]

In one of his last articles, Chateaubriand predicted
the downfall of the Decazes Ministry.[28] little could he
have known that Louvel's dagger would fulfill that prophecy,
but the shock of the act only reinforced the blame for
France's political turmoil which had been placed on the
Ministry all along.

Of course, no such blame was really

appropriate; the crime only confirmed what the Royalists had
been saying for some time, that the policies of the

27. "Politique," v.4-, no.47, August,1819, p.375.
28. "Lettre sur Paris," v.6, no.68, Jan., 1820, p.

144.
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government were bringing France to ruin.

Many had been

saying so for years, and their antagonistic attitudes toward
their opponents only widened the gulf between them.

•

Epilogue

Chateaubriand had tried to bring the factions
together.

Sincere if not naive, he had labored to reconcile

almost impossible forces, and he himself, like the rest of
France, had become a victim of them.

After the murder of

Berry, he gave up his politicl pen to seek his own
ambitions, and ended up again, three years later, the great
enemy of Ministerial government.

Neither he alone, nor the

Royalists, whose shouts of "Long live the King in spite of
hi~self"

betrayed their true feelings, brought down the

reign of Charles X in 1830.
If anything

~as

inevitable in the Restoration, it was

only that the loss of Monarchic rule, by no means guaranteed
either in 1815, nor in 1820, would at least guarantee for
France decades of political confusion and turmoil.

By

sealing the fate of the Bourbons, France itself would have
to answer to its actions.

As de Bertier has written:

Who was the real loser - the nation, which
at that hou~ [1830] thought it was victorious; or
the obstinate old man who was leaving these shores
for good! The Latter was giving up the most
glorious throne of the finest kingdom in Europe;
the former was depriving itself of a principle of
political authority, of national unity, and of
social stabiLit~, the equivalent of which it was
never again able to recapture. After a hundred
and thirty ~eaxs of revolutions and wars, of
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dictatorial or anarchical governments, France can
today estimate the irreparable seriousness of the
wound which she inflicted upon herself by her
eviction of Charles X, and she beholds with
nostalgic envy her great neighbor across the
Channel who had the wisdom to reconcile
monarchical tradition with the inevitable
democratic evolution.[l]
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_Sadly, what Chateaubriand had urged, that France must learn
to accept the new

principle~

of political authority while

appreciating the advantages of monarchy, was lost upon the
men of the Restoration. He had foreseen the consequences of
extremism and blind ambitions where many had refused to see
them.

If there is any consolation, all could now,

ironically, see the wisdom of de Bertier's conclusion •

•
1. De Bertier, fhe Restoration, p.

456.
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